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This paper studies technology policy within a version of Jones’s (1995) non-scale R&D-
based growth framework that incorporates imitation of foreign techniques. The transitional
dynamcis of the model can account for some well-known empirical regularities regarding the
relationship between the level of economic development and public support to technology
innovation and imitation. The paper also documents that most predictions of the model are
consistent with the empirical evidence. Overall, these results suggest that foreign techniques
can be the main driving force behind imitation policy. The paper shows as well that, even
though policy in Jones-type non-scale models has no long-run growth e¤ects, level e¤ects can
be substantial.
Keywords: Innovation, Imitation; Policy; Growth; Transitional Dynamics.
21I N T R O D U C T I O N
Recently, Jones and Williams (2000) have reminded us that the determinants of technology
policy are not well understood. In general, governments support of knowledge accumulation
tries to in‡uence the path of technological change and, therefore, to promote economic growth.
But technology acquisition comes from two di¤erent sources: innovation and imitation. In
addition, the imitation of foreign ideas is a main source of productivity growth in both advanced
and developing countries, as Eaton and Kortum (1996) and Coe et al. (1997) show. Despite
this evidence, most of the theoretical literature either has exclusively focused on innovation
policy or has studied innovation and imitation that coexist only in closed-economy scenarios.
The purpose of this paper is to study optimal government technology policy within a version
of Jones’s (1995) R&D-based growth model. In particular, we introduce imitation of foreign
techniques into Jones’s (1995) hybrid non-scale framework in which sustained long-run growth
depends on both exogenous labor growth and endogenous technical change.1 In the model,
technical progress occurs either by copying foreign ideas or inventing new ones.2 Both imitation
and innovation are costly, but the former is generally cheaper (Mans…eld et al. 1981). The two
activities coexist in equilibrium because their technologies display diminishing returns to R&D
e¤ort. We look at economic development as the transition path toward a new steady-state with
higher levels of income. We study dynamics using high-degree polynomial approximations; in
this, we follow the method proposed by Judd (1992).
The model setup is very similar to Jones and Williams (2000). As in their paper, two dis-
tortions induce underinvestment in R&D. First, monopoly pricing of intermediate goods that
embody the new ideas reduces sales below its social-optimum level, thus preventing inventors
from appropriating the whole consumer surplus. Because of this market failure, the paper con-
siders a generalized production function that permits relatively small, empirically-supported
mark-ups. Second, the R&D technology exhibits intertemporal knowledge spillovers;t h a ti s ,
current R&D e¤ort generates ideas that raise researchers’ productivity in future periods. On
the other hand, two distortions in the model generate overinvestment. Also as in Jones and
1See Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999) and Eicher and Turnovsky (1999a) for a detailed discussion on non-
scale models of growth.
2The imitation of foreign techniques and products by domestic producers is not the only form of technology
transfer. There are other channels such as FDI, international trade, international licensing agreements, joint
ventures, and turnkey projects. What really matters, however, is that the transmission and assimilation of new
ideas is not automatic, and is costly, especially in the case of foreign techniques (Pack and Saggi 1997). We
focus on imitation because it captures well this notion, and makes the model tractable.
3Williams (2000), duplication of R&D e¤ort caused, for example, by R&D races generates a
negative congestion externality across …rms. However, unlike these authors, we consider tech-
nology imitation that induces a second negative external e¤ect due to diminishing imitation
opportunities. Speci…cally, as the technological gap decreases, imitation becomes more expen-
sive; therefore, present R&D e¤ort diminishes future imitation productivity.
The model can replicate some well-known empirical regularities. In particular, the model
implies that the ratio of imitation to innovation support must decrease with the level of income
– thus solving a puzzle raised by Rustichini and Schmitz (1991) – and that the share of
public expenditure in innovation rises with the economic development level. In addition, the
model predicts that the output share of total technology policy subsidies increase along the
convergence path, and that the share of government investment in imitation displays a hump
shape. We present cross-country data on technology policy that support these predictions.
Overall, these …ndings suggest that foreign techniques can be the main driving force behind
imitation policy.
The key feature of the model behind the results is the imitation technology. The acquisition
of foreign ideas generates two opposing forces. As a country catches up with the more advanced
nations, both the imitation productivity and the negative externality induced by diminishing
imitation opportunities decline. The former e¤ect reduces the incentive to support imitation,
whereas the latter encourages both innovation and copying subsidies.
The paper also asks the following question: How does government policy a¤ect economic
development? Even though in Jones-type non-scale growth models like ours, policy has no long-
run growth e¤ects – which has been a source of critique to Jones (1995) seminal contribution
(see Dinopoulos and Thompson 1998) – we show that level e¤ects can be substantial. The
complete absence of policy intervention can produce important di¤erences with respect to
economies that follow the social optimum. At the steady-state, the relative level of output per
capita can fall below 60 percent, which implies a loss in consumption of more than 7 percent.
The model predicts that the contribution of physical capital accumulation subsidies is slightly
larger than the one of technology policy.
Other market failures have been studied in the growth literature. Dinopoulos and Thomp-
son (1998), and Jones and Williams (2000), among others, consider that new ideas may replace
current versions of existing innovations, thus giving way to a creating destruction e¤ect that
causes overinvestment in R&D. Howitt (1999), and Sergerstrom (2000) include cross-sector
4knowledge spillovers: the discovery of new varieties of intermediate goods raises productivity
of existing ones. This is a source of R&D underinvestment. Grossman and Helpman (1991),
Segerstrom (1991), and Davidson and Segerstrom (1998) consider the negative external e¤ect
associated to the destruction of innovator’s pro…ts that imitation produces. We do not include
these other market failures for the shake of simplicity.
There are several papers that endogenously determine the optimal allocations both to
imitation and innovation, and study R&D policy. Segerstrom (1991), Davidson and Segerstrom
(1998), Rustichini and Schmitz (1991), and Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) do so, but within
closed-economy models in which imitation targets domestically generated ideas. In addition,
the last two papers exclusively focus on the knowledge-spillover e¤ect that the two activities
generate; a positive subsidy to both imitation and innovation is then always the optimal policy.
Like us, Grossman and Helpman (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), and Glass and Saggi
(1998) are general equilibrium open-economy models of growth. In these papers, however,
imitative R&D and innovative R&D can not coexist in the same country. Currie et al. (1999)
do present an open-economy model in which the two activities coexist in equilibrium.3 But
they do not include diminishing imitation opportunities, nor analyze transitional dynamics.
Finally, R&D policy in Jones-type non-scale growth frameworks has been studied by
Williams (1999), and Jones and Williams (2000). Unlike these papers, we also study tech-
nology imitation policy. Furthermore, we analyze how policy intensity changes as initially
poor nations develop and progressively become more integrated in the rest of the world.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Optimal government policy is derived
in section 3. Section 4 studies transitional dynamics, and in particular, how tax rates vary
along the development path, and how policy a¤ects welfare. Section 5 presents empirical
evidence on technology policy that supports the results. Section 6 concludes.
3So do Van Elkan (1996) and Perez-Sebastian (2000). They do not though study technology policy.
52 THE ENVIRONMENT
The population in this economy consists of identical in…nitely-lived agents, and grows exoge-
nously at rate n: Agents have preferences only over consumption. Each period, consumers
are endowed with one unit of time that inelastically supply as labor to two types of …rms:
consumption-goods producers, and intermediate-goods manufacturers. The latter invest re-
sources in R&D to learn new designs for new types of producer durables. When a new design
is learned, the …rm that absorbs this knowledge acquires a perpetual patent. This allows the
…rm to manufacture the new variety, and practice monopoly pricing.4 In this economy, there
also exists a government that collects lump-sum taxes, and uses the revenues to tax/subsidize
the purchase of intermediate goods by …nal-goods producers and the R&D activity.
The …nal-goods sector is made up of a large number of identical …rms. At any time period
t, they produce an homogeneous output Yt using labor Lt and a variety of intermediate capital










; 0 <®<1 ;° > 0 : (1)
Intermediate-goods are complementary when °<1;t h e ya r es u b s t i t u t e si f°>1.
Intermediate-goods manufacturers borrow capital that is allocated to producing existing
varieties of producer durables and to R&D. At any point in time t, the R&D activity increases
the mass of producer durable types At available for …nal output production according to the
following aggregate R&D technology:
















; ; ¸ 2 (0;1); ´>0;Á>0; At · Aw
t .( 2 )
That is, …rms learn new designs either by investing in innovation RIt or in imitation RCt.
Copying targets an international knowledge pool of size Aw
t that grows exogenously at rate
gAw.5 This lab-equipment form implies that the R&D input is produced with the same tech-
nology as consumption goods; capital and labor are just shifted from production of …nal goods
into production of new designs. In equation (2), Á captures intertemporal knowledge spillovers
4Producers are assumed to be unable to circumvent the local monopoly by importing intermediate goods
from the rest of the world.
5The exogeneity of the law of motion of the international pool of ideas implies that we abstract from the fact
that domestic innovation might yield new goods that will add up to the international pool of designs. We do it
for simplicity. Notice, however, that this e¤ect will be small for low levels of economic development because at
this stage innovation investment is relatively low.
6in learning.6 The parameter ¸ controls for the fact that two or more researchers can come up
with the same idea either by chance or because of R&D races. This represents a duplication of
e¤ort. We assume that …rms do not take it into account when they choose the R&D allocations.
That is, we think of each of the terms that are to the power of ¸ in expression (2) as having
two multiplicative components: one re‡ects the constant returns that the …rm perceives over
each e¤ective R&D input; the second one (R¸¡1
It and [RCt(´A w
t =At)¯]¸¡1 for innovation and
imitation, respectively) provides the size of the negative congestion externality.
In equation (2), the term in brackets captures the e¤ect of imitation in the economy’s
technical progress. Local …rms invest resources in order to absorb and adapt the information
needed to replicate new products invented abroad. It di¤ers from innovation in that the
number of goods that can be copied at any point in time is limited to the …nite number that
have been discovered elsewhere.7 The speci…cation incorporates an advantage of backwardness
or catch-up e¤ect: we are assuming that the cost of imitating foreign designs decreases as the
worldwide stock gets relatively larger.8 The R&D technology also allows imitation to become
more expensive than innovation. A value of ´ less than one would imply that some foreign
ideas’ technical speci…cations are very complex, or that adaptation costs are too big, making
the cost of imitating them relatively high compare to the cost of inventing a new one.
6The literature does not really agree on the sign of Á. It does recognize the existence of intertemporal
knowledge spillovers in innovation. But Kortum (1993), among others, argues that diminishing technological
opportunities might be also present. From the imitation viewpoint, there exists empirical evidence supporting
a positive value of Á. For example, Romer (1993) and Eaton and Kortum (1996) …nd that the ability to take
advantage of the ideas available in the rest of the word increases with a country’s technology level. The …nal
sigh of Á will then depend on the relative importance of these forces. As will be seen, our calibration exercise
delivers only positive values of Á.
7A su¢cient condition for this to be the case is that A
w
t >A t+1 at any t. We then need to assume that ´
is su¢ciently small, but this requirement has no e¤ect on the interior solution optimal allocations. Since A
w
t ¸
At at each date, A
w
t (1 + gAw) ¸ At+1 must also hold. Additionally, at any point in time, the interior solution
optimal allocations are a function of ´t i m e sA
w
t : For any optimal sequence fAzg
1
z=t, we can then always …nd a
su¢ciently large A
w







t (1 + gAw)(1 + "),a n d´ as ´
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8Nelson and Phelps (1966) are the …rst to construct a formal model based on the catch-up term. Parente
and Prescott (1994) notice that this formulation implies that development rates increase over time (with A
w
t ),
and provide empirical evidence that is consistent with this implication.
7Since At is in the denominator, there exist diminishing imitation opportunities, which imply
a negative externality from current R&D investment to future imitation productivity; higher
levels of R&D e¤ort today may decrease the relative size of the international pool of ideas,
thus increasing the cost of copying in the future.
For simplicity of exposition, we turn now to examining optimal tax policy. Further in-
formation about the decentralized setup will be provided as the need arises. For a detailed
description of the decentralized economy, see Appendix A.
83 OPTIMAL POLICY IN A DECENTRALIZED ECONOMY
WITH TAXES
In order to study optimal policy, we must compare the equilibrium allocations in the decentral-
ized economy without public intervention to the ones desired by the government. The section
starts describing the public sector. After this, we obtain optimal tax and subsidy schemes, and
analyze their determinants.
Policymakers have the power to tax/subsidize …rms and consumers. We assume that their
goal is to eliminate market imperfections so as to make the model’s variables follow their
socially optimal time paths.9 We can, therefore, focus on a central planner that chooses tax
rates so as to equalize private and social returns. In our framework, there are four sources
of market failure. First, monopoly pricing of producer durables implies that the amount
of intermediate goods rented by …nal-goods producers is too low from the social planner’s
viewpoint, thus generating an insu¢cient stock of capital in the economy. The other three
market failure sources a¤ect the R&D allocation. Congestion externalities and diminishing
imitation opportunities make the private R&D investment be too high, whereas intertemporal
knowledge spillovers have the opposite e¤ect. The social planner will then tax/subsidize the
purchase of intermediate-goods, and the R&D activity.
For simplicity, we assume that the government raises revenue through (non-distortionary)
lump-sum taxes paid by consumers, and is constrained to maintaining a balanced budget at
each date; that is,
¿ht = ¿CtRCt + ¿ItRIt +
Z At
0
¿xit xit di, for all t;( 3 )
where ¿ht is the lump-sum tax; ¿xit i st h er a t ea tw h i c ht h ep u r c h a s eo fp r o d u c ti is subsidized
at t;a n d¿It and ¿Ct are the rates at which the government subsidizes investment in innovation
and imitation, respectively.
As mentioned above, subsidies will be chosen so as to make the competitive equilibrium
achieve the command optimum allocations. Next, we state the central planner’s problem.
Let Kt and Ct denote the country’s physical capital stock and aggregate consumption at
date t, respectively. The former equals
R At
0 xit di (A¹ xt in the symmetric equilibrium, with
9The assumption that government’s goal is to maximize social welfare is appropriate in our model because
we have homogeneous agents. Benevolent policymakers seem to be, however, the exception. There is an entire
literature in public economics/public choice that models the self-serving behavior of politicians. For example,
see Alesina and Cukierman (1990).
9¹ xt = xit 8i), and depreciates at rate ±. The central planner chooses the sequence of allocations
fRCt;R It;K t;C tg
1
t=0 to maximize the lifetime utility of the representative consumer subject























t ;( 5 )
Kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Kt = Yt ¡ Ct ¡ RIt ¡ RCt;( 6 )

























K0;L 0; A0;A w0 given;
where ½ is the discount factor. Equation (5) is the well-known Cobb-Douglas form in which
production function (1) takes at the aggregate level; where » = 1
° ¡ (1 ¡ ®). Yt can be
interpreted as the Gross Domestic Product of the economy at date t. Expression (6) represents
a feasibility constraint as well as the law of motion of the capital stock.
We are ready to obtain the tax and subsidy schemes. The concavity of the production and
R&D technologies guarantees that output will be distributed evenly over all activities. From
the planner’s problem, the …rst order condition with respect to physical capital investment
gives the intertemporal sequence of socially optimal aggregate consumptions,
Ct+1 =[ ½ (1 + rt+1)]
1
¾ (1 + n)
1¡ 1
¾ Ct;( 1 0 )
where
rt =( 1¡ ®)
Yt
Kt
¡ ±.( 1 1 )
Condition (10) is standard. It implies that, at the optimum, the gross growth rate of the
utility value of consumption per capita must equal the discounted returns to saving, taking
into account population growth. That is, individuals must be indi¤erent between consuming
one additional unit of output today and saving it, consuming the proceeds tomorrow. From
10expression (10), we deduce that the central planner equates the marginal productivity of in-
termediate goods to their marginal production cost, given by the economy’s interest rate (rt)
plus the depreciation rate.
The competitive equilibrium optimality condition for physical capital is di¤erent. Assume
that one unit of raw capital can be costlessly converted into one unit of any type of producer
durable, and that intermediate goods are rented rather than sold. Intermediate-goods pro-
ducers act as monopolists, taking the …nal-output manufacturers’ inverse demand function
as given. The solution to their problem is well known: monopolists charge a mark-up over
marginal cost; and in the symmetric equilibrium, assuming that the number of …rms is large,
the mark-up equals the elasticity of substitution between intermediate capital goods. At time
t, the rental price of variety i (pit)i st h e ng i v e nb y
pit =
rt + ±
° (1 ¡ ®)
=¹ pt ; for all i.( 1 2 )
In order to eliminate this ine¢ciency, the market price paid by …nal-goods producers net
of subsidies (pit(1¡¿xti)) must be equalized to the producer-durables marginal cost. Equation
(12) implies that the optimal policy is to subsidize the purchase of intermediate goods at rate
¿xti =1¡ ° (1 ¡ ®)=¹ ¿xt; for all i 2 (0;A t): (13)
The central planner will choose ¿It and ¿Ct so as to make the decentralized economy R&D
investment equal the socially optimal amount. Both innovation and imitation will coexist in
equilibrium because of the existence of diminishing returns to R&D e¤ort. From the planner’s
problem FOCs with respect to the R&D activities, we …nd that the socially optimal ratio of










.( 1 4 )
It states that the weight of imitation in total R&D investment rises with the technological gap.
Let Tt denote the relative size of the modi…ed international pool of designs,
´A w
t
At .I nt e r m s
of Rt = RIt + RCt, R&D technology (7) can be written as










.( 1 5 )
Using equations (10), (11), (14), (15), and the FOC with respect to either innovation or







































At the optimum, the planner must be indi¤erent between investing one additional unit of
output in intermediate-goods production and R&D. The RHS of equation (16) is the social
return to R&D. One additional unit of R&D input generates
¸(At+1¡At)
Rt new ideas for new
types of producer durables. Each of these new designs will increase next period’s output by
»Yt+1













shadow price of one additional design, which must equal its marginal (social) cost.
We now determine the competitive equilibrium allocation to R&D. Free entry in the
producer-durables sector implies that, at each instant in time, the amount invested in learn-
ing must equal the present value of the ideas. We will have then two zero-pro…t equilibrium


















where Vt is the present value of any patent right at date t – notice that all designs are alike in
productivity terms, regardless of whether they are copied or created from scratch. Combining
expressions (17) and (18), we obtain the optimal ratio of imitation to innovation investment













.( 1 9 )
From equations (14) and (19), we …nd that to achieve its goal the government must subsidize
innovation and imitation at the same rate; that is,
¿Ct = ¿It =¹ ¿Rt for all t: (20)
The reason is that the size of the external e¤ects depends on objects that are common to
innovation and imitation. In particular, the e¤ect of monopoly pricing and duplication of
R&D e¤ort is a function of (°;®) and ¸, respectively. The impact of both knowledge spillovers
12and diminishing imitation opportunities, in turn, depends on the total amount of designs At,
and both innovation and imitation are perfect substitutes in increasing At.
For
1¡¿Rt+1
1¡¿Rt su¢ciently close to 1, Appendix A shows that the optimal R&D subsidy rate
is




















.( 2 1 )
Unlike the social planner, …rms do not take into account the existence of diminishing returns
in learning due to duplication of e¤ort. They equate marginal costs to average, instead of
marginal, R&D productivity. As a consequence, ¹ ¿Rt may increase with parameter ¸. The rate
at which R&D must be subsidized declines with the mark-up ratio charged by intermediate-
goods manufacturers, [° (1 ¡ ®)]
¡1. This occurs because the mark-up induced by monopoly
pricing is irrelevant for the central planner, but it raises the private returns from R&D in-











A capture the e¤ect of current R&D on future
productivity, which the decentralized economy does not internalize; the third one, in partic-
ular, represents the negative externality caused by diminishing imitation opportunities. The
R&D share
Rt+1
Yt+1 weights the incidence of the last two external e¤ects because they depend on
future investment.10 Whether the social planner imposes a tax or a subsidy to R&D clearly
depends on the model parameters’ values.
10From equation (16), it is easy to see that the externalities a¤ect the optimal R&D share in the same
direction as the optimal R&D tax rates. Substituting for it would not then alter our conclusions, but would
make expression (21) cumbersome.
134 EQUILIBRIUM DYNAMICS
This section presents the main results of the paper. Speci…cally, it studies how the shares of the
di¤erent policy components evolve along the development path, and assess how policy, in turn,
a¤ects welfare. The decision rules or policy functions describe the equilibrium allocations. The
model, however, does not deliver closed form solutions for them. Linearizing the system around
the steady-state is not useful because our goal is to study the adjustment path for state space
points that lie far away from the steady-state. We therefore choose to numerically approximate
the solutions. Appendix A provides a detailed description of the method followed.
The section …rst determines the rate at which variables eventually grow, when the economy
achieves its steady-state path. Second, we choose values for the di¤erent parameters. Finally,
we present the transitional dynamics results.
4.1 Long-run growth rates
Let’s, for a moment, restrict our attention to the perfect-foresight equilibrium balanced growth
path in which the growth rates of all variables in the model are constant. Let x¤ and Gx denote
the optimal allocation and the grows growth rate of variable x at steady-state, respectively;
and de…ne gx as Gx ¡ 1. Equality (6) implies that gY = gC = gK = gRI = gRC.F r o mR & D
technology (7), we see immediately that because gRI = gRC, it must be true that gA = gAw,
otherwise gA cannot be constant. For simplicity, we assume that all economies in the world
a r ea l i k e ,a n dg r o wa tt h es a m er a t ei nt h el o n gr u n . T h i si m p l i e st h a tgAw must, in turn,
equal gA. The value of the ratio
Aw
t
At then remains invariant along the balanced growth path,
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® .( 2 3 )
The model does not therefore display scale e¤ects on the steady-state growth rates; they are
exogenous, exclusively pinned down by the production and R&D technologies. In the log-run,
policy only has level e¤ects. Growth e¤ects are however possible along the transition.
11We need to assume that 1 ¡ Á>¸
»
®.O t h e r w i s e ,n ob a l a n c e dg r o w t hp a t he x i s t s .




Case ¾¸Implied Á Calibrated ¯
® 0.64 1 1 0.25 0.92 2.03
½ 0.96 2 1 0.5 0.84 0.83
± 0.1 3 1 0.75 0.76 0.42
n 0.014 4 2 0.25 0.92 2.3
» 0.126 5 2 0.5 0.84 1.03
T¤ 0.41 6 2 0.75 0.76 0.58
4.2 Calibration
Table 1 shows the parameter values used to carry out our simulations. We assign values of 0:96
to the discount factor (½), and 0:1 to the depreciation rate (±). From Kydland and Prescott
(1991), we take a labor share of 0:64 (®). We set the growth rate of the population (n)t o1:4%
per year, the average value for the United States during the period 1950-1980. We assign to
the output per capita growth rate the averaged value in the Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)
intermediate sample, 2:2%. From Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), we take a mark-up
ratio of 1:35.12 Estimates of the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between
present and future consumption go from 1 to 3:5 (Hall 1988, and Attanasio and Weber 1993);
we run the experiments for two di¤erent values: ¾ =1and ¾ =2 .
The calibration of the R&D technology parameters is more problematic. There are not
reliable estimates of ¸. Dinopoulos and Thompson (2000) …nd values of ¸ as low as 0:17,
whereas Jones and Williams (2000) show that 0:5 could be a lower bound. Given that the
literature does not provide much guidance, we carry out a sensitivity analysis, and present
results for ¸ equal 0:25, 0:5,a n d0:75. Equation (14) says that Tt equals the ratio of imitation
to innovation support. Based on agricultural data reported by Judd et al. (1986, page 86), the
average ratio of extension (or imitation) to research (innovation) support for the industrialized
world is very close to 0:41 both in 1970 and 1980.13 This is the value that we assign to T¤.
There are not any empirical estimates of the parameter ¯. Following Parente and Prescott
(1994), we pick the value of ¯ for which the planning solution best …ts the Japanese output
12They estimate a producer durable markup ratio using electronic and electric equipment data. Furthermore,
they adjust it to separate out …xed costs, which are completely absent in our model.
13The industrialized group contains the nations that in 1980 were OECD members, except for Greece, Por-
t u g a l ,S p a i n ,a n dT u r k e y .
15data, taking as given the rest of parameters’ values. In particular, we use the fact that Japan’
per capita output moved from 19 percent to 74 percent of U.S. output during 1950 to 1980.
Using the steady-state allocations in the command optimum, we directly obtain the re-
maining model’s parameters from the above ones. The implied value of Á comes from equation
(23). The balanced growth path real interest rate can be obtained from equations (23) and
(10); r¤ equals 8 percent if ¾ =1 ,a n d10:3 percent when ¾ =2 .
4.3 The imitation of foreign ideas and R&D support
We …rst establish the only result that does not require numerical simulations. Because it
is optimal to subsidize the two R&D activities at the same rate – recall expression (20) –
public support to imitation and innovation are given by ¹ ¿Rt RCt and ¹ ¿Rt RIt, respectively.






. This …nding has an important implication. Since in our model the relative
size of the international pool of designs is inversely related to the country’s level of economic
development, we have actually shown that the ratio of imitation to innovation support decreases
with the level of economic development. This is consistent with the empirical evidence reported
by Rustichini and Schmitz (1991). The reason is that the smaller the number of ideas from
which a country can choose, the lower the average productivity of imitation.
Next, we look at the equilibrium behavior of the model in response to two simultaneous
shocks, one to each state variable. Given the procedure followed to calibrate the parameter
¯, we use Japanese numbers. Extrapolating from pre-World War II data, Christiano (1989)
estimates that the Japanese capital stock in 1946 was only 12 percent of its pre-war steady-
state value. In turn, we pick the shock to the relative size of the international knowledge pool
so as to make per capita output 19 percent of its steady-state level. Assuming that the U.S.
was in steady-state in 1950, this implies initial values for the capital stock and total factor
productivity (TFP) of 4:9 percent and 56:3 percent of the U.S. level, respectively. Starting
from these initial conditions, we run simulations for six triples (¾;¸;¯) that deliver social
solutions consistent with Japan’s convergence speed (see table 1).14
14We do not prove formally that the stable adjustment path is unique. Eicher and Turnovsky (1999b),
however, establish su¢cient conditions for this to be so in a very similar framework. Those conditions are
equivalent to requiring that Á + ¸» < 1 and ®> 1
2 i no u rm o d e l .I tt u r n so u tt h a tt h ec a l i b r a t e dp a r a m e t e r s
ful…l these restrictions. Furthermore, during the innumerable simulations, we always found the same stable
arm, independent of the initial guess used to approximate the decision rules, and the initial values of the state
variables.
16Figure 1 presents the adjustment paths for selected variables. Starting from the same
relative stocks of technology and capital, the command optimum (C.O.) and the zero-tax
competitive equilibrium (C.E.) follow very di¤erent paths. The discrepancy between the two
equilibrium allocations is what induces tax policy. As we saw, equation (13), producer durables
are always subsidized at the same rate. R&D policy, on the other hand, is state-dependent.
The bottom half of …gure 1 depict the series of the ratios of R&D and R&D support to output.
The …rst thing that we observe is that an R&D subsidy is the optimal policy only if diminishing
returns to R&D are su¢ciently weak. When ¸ is small, on the contrary, R&D races generate
overinvestment, and an R&D tax becomes optimal.
To understand why public support to R&D declines as ¾ rises, note that the amount
of government giveaways rises both with the subsidization rate and the R&D share. Recall
also our approximation, given by equation (21): the subsidization rate declines both with
the relative size of the international pool of ideas and ¯ (the negative externality e¤ect).
R&D investment in turn declines with its productivity, and with its opportunity cost, that
is, the interest rate. A larger ¾ means a stronger preference for consumption smoothing,
which generates lower investment. As we see in …gure 1, the interest rate must then rise to
reduce the saving rate and clear the …nancial market, because for ¾>1 present and future
consumption are complementary; thus reducing the R&D share. In addition, since investment
in R&D lowers, the value of ¯ needed to reproduce the Japanese convergence speed rises. Both
this stronger diminishing imitation opportunity e¤ect and the larger interest rate reduce the
optimal amounts of innovation and imitation subsidies.
Given that governments actually support technology acquisition e¤ort, we hereafter focus
on the ¸ =0 :75 case, since it is the only one that produces positive subsidization rates. Except
for the initial years, the R&D support share (R+I) increases as output moves towards the
steady-state. Following the same logic as above, the fast decline in the interest rate is behind
the initially rapid increase in R&D support – notice that in equation (21) a larger R&D share
also contributes to make the R&D subsidization rate less negative (or more positive). After
around 5 periods, the R&D share starts going down, and so does its support share. It is the
result of the decline in the relative size of the international pool of designs, which reduces the
productivity of imitation. This e¤ect can also be observed in …gure 1 by looking at innovation
investment, which begins increasing signi…cantly only after 5 periods. After 15 periods, interest
rates and R&D shares are very close to their steady-state values. The decrease in the negative
17Figure 1: Adjustment paths and optimal technology policy, ¸ = 0.75 except when noticed
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18externality, induced by the shrinking relative size of the international pool of designs, then
becomes the dominant force, raising R&D support along the development path.
The interaction between the negative externality, the decreasing imitation productivity,
and the declining interest rates is responsible for the ups and downs followed by R&D support
at early stages of development.
The fourth row of charts depicts technology policy at a more disaggregated level. Support
to imitation is the most important component during the …rst decades, and displays a hump
shape. When ¾ =1 , the decline in the interest rate is responsible for the initial fast rise in
imitation support, as explained previously. Subsequently, the decrease in the relative imita-
tion productivity inverts this tendency, making it go down. Notice that, for the same reasons,
the economy’s imitation investment also picks very soon, regardless of the value of ¾,a st h e
…fth row of charts show. For the ¾ =2case, however, the hump-shaped imitation subsidy
share picks approximately at the middle of the adjustment path. This occurs because of two
opposing forces. First, the decrease along the development path in the size of the negative
externality generated by the existence of diminishing imitation opportunities pushes the imi-
tation subsidization rate up, without a¤ecting total imitation investment. Second, the decline
in the relative imitation productivity pushes down the weight of copying in technology policy.
The former dominates at low levels of economic development, whereas the latter does later
on. We can also see that the public innovation investment share rises over time – the two
forces now push in the same direction. innovation and innovation support eventually overcome
imitation and imitation support as the main components of R&D.
4.4 Policy e¤ects
Finally, we study how policy a¤ects long-run output levels, and welfare. This exercise is
especially interesting because Jones-type non-scale growth models do not predict persistent
policy e¤ects. This has been criticized by advocates of endogenous growth theory, who have
proposed R&D-based growth frameworks that remove scale e¤ects but preserve long-run policy
e¤ects.15 This section shows that the impact of policy actions in Jones-type models with
imitation can be substantial; thus preserving an important role of policymakers in economic
development. We also study the contribution of the di¤erent policy components to the welfare
improvement.
15For example, Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), and Howitt (1999).
19Table 2: Steady-state relative below-trend levels of output, technology, and capital for the
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The experiment requires comparing the planning solution to the zero-tax competitive equi-
librium. Table 2 presents welfare measures, and the relative levels of output, TFP, and physical
capital at the competitive equilibrium steady-state.
The decentralized economy does not take into account diminishing returns to R&D. When
these are strong, non-subsidized private …rms invest more resources in learning than the central
planner, ending up with higher technology stock at the steady-state. As diminishing returns to
R&D decline, the social return to learning new ideas overtake the private return, and eventually
the opposite scenario emerges.
The competitive equilibrium always generates lower levels of output, and the di¤erence
increases with ¸. The reason is the low degree of capital accumulation. For example, for a
value of ¸ of 0:5, the levels of output and capital for the decentralized equilibrium are less than
75 and 55 percent of the command optimum steady-state levels, respectively. These …gures
go down to 64 and 47 percent when ¸ equals 0:75, which represents a loss of one third of
output. This does not however imply that the bene…t of correcting the market failure induced
by monopoly pricing outweighs the gain from technology policy. Notice that the technological
gap is partly responsible for the low levels of capital. In order to assess the contribution of
these two types of policies, we compare the social optimum outcome to two di¤erent scenarios.
In the …rst one, only optimal R&D taxation is implemented. In the second one, only the
purchase of producer durables is subsidized. We carry out this analysis for the ¸ =0 :75 case
because it is the one that generates positive R&D support rates, which is what we observe in
the data.
When the government merely executes R&D policy, technology reaches its social optimum
level. From equations (5), (11) and (12), the relative capital stock then equals [(1¡®)°]
1
®.F o r
our parameter values, this expression takes on 62:3 percent, and output is 84:5 percent of the
20command optimum level. If, on the other hand, only the market failure generated by monopoly






to equal its social optimum. Equation (5) then says that the
relative levels of output and capital are the same, and equal relative TFP to the power of 1
®.
The numerical analysis implies that in this scenario relative TFP and output levels are 86:7
and 80:0 percent if ¾ =1 ,a n d93:0 and 89:3 percent if ¾ =2 , respectively. Comparing to
the numbers in table 2, we see that the e¤ect on output of government’s reaction to monopoly
pricing also increases TFP; for example, it goes from 75:9 up to 86:7 percent for ¾ =1 .T h e
reason is that a larger ¹ ¿x provides incentives to increase R&D investment, reducing the need
to subsidize it, as we see in equation (21).
The R&D policy contribution to long-run output, therefore, outweighs the one of producer-
durable subsidies when the preference for consumption smoothing is weaker, and the other way
round. This occurs because the latter depends only on the mark-up ratio, whereas the former
decreases with ¾ due to the reasons exposed before, agents are willing to sacri…ce less present
consumption and ¯ need to rise. If we look at …gures 2 and 3, which depict the data that will
be presented in section 5, we see that the adjusted lines predict a share of total public support
to technology acquisition (research plus extension in …gure 3) for the most advanced nations
below 3 percent. The results for the ¾ =2case better …t those numbers. Our model then
predicts a slightly higher contribution of capital formation policy.
The welfare measure in table 2 gives the permanent percentage increase in competitive equi-
librium consumption necessary to make consumers indi¤erent between following the socially
optimal paths and following the zero-tax decentralized economy sequences. We see that the
complete absence of policy intervention produce welfare losses that are always over 2 percent,
reaching 7 percent for the low smoothing, weak diminishing returns case. A higher degree of
consumption smoothing causes di¤erences between the two equilibria to decline. If we look at
the welfare measure, the losses when ¾ =2are always lower than if ¾ =1 , and do not vary
much when ¸ changes. The positive relationship between the loss measure and ¸ even vanishes
when ¾ =2 .
21Figure 2: Gross domestic R&D expenditure (GERD) …nanced by government as percentage of
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225 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON INNOVATION AND IMITA-
TION POLICY
Whereas some of the model’s predictions replicate well-known stylized facts, other predictions
are not documented in the literature. This section explores the available empirical evidence
on technology policy, and argues that it supports the main implications of the model.
Speci…cally, we use international data to study the relationship between technology policy
and a country’s relative income level. Total government R&D expenditure is available for
OECD nations. Figure 2 shows a clear positive relationship between economy-wide public
R&D e¤ort and income levels for the Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) 22-OECD group, as
the model predicts. The straight line is an OLS regression line which turns out to be very
signi…cant, with a p-value for the slope coe¢cient of 2.4E-4.
Besides innovation e¤ort, R&D numbers include as well imitative activities such as reverse
engineering and technology adaptation. But public imitation support is also composed of
technical advisory services for potential adopters, and training programs for scientists and
engineers. As far as we know, this last type of data only exists for a large cross-section of
countries in the agricultural sector. In particular, cross-country data on public investment
in research programs and extension services in agriculture as a percentage of the value of
the agricultural product is provided by Judd, Boyce and Evenson (1986). Extension, that is,
technical advisory services for farmer, re‡ects only public imitation e¤ort. The research (R&D)
data, however, do not separate the imitative and the innovative components. To be able to
compare the data to the model’s predictions, we hereafter assume that R&D expenditure only
captures innovative e¤ort.16
We have data for 78 countries for the years 1962, 1965, 1968, 1971, 1974, 1977 and 1980.17
The Penn World Tables, version 5.6, provides annual ‡ows of GDP per worker. We want to
examine what the data say about the functional form relating R&D and extension subsidies
and a country’s level of income. To do this, we compute each variable’s average value for every





i + "j;( 2 4 )
16This is equivalent to supposing that the imitative-R&D share in income does not vary.
17We excluded planned economies (Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, and China) because their government
support …gures do not re‡ect market failure. We also get rid of Zambia because its extension and research
support shares changed very dramatically for very small variations of its GDP per capita level.
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24where SR;j is the government support share in output in country j; yj is relative GDP per
worker (RGDPW) as a percentage of the U.S. level; "j is the disturbance; and the ai’s are the
regression coe¢cients. We follow the usual approach to choose the degree of the polynomial, N.
We …rst estimate the log-lineal relationship (i.e., N =1 ), and then add new polynomial terms
(N =2 ,t h e nN =3 , and so on) until the measure of …t, the adjusted-R2 in our case, stops
improving.18 In addition, to make sure that added terms to the polynomial provide valuable
information, we require that all coe¢cients must be signi…cant at the 10 percent level. We
also analyze the relationship for the 22-OECD group. Given the low number of observations
in this second sample, we limit to two the maximum polynomial degree to avoid over…tting.
Figure 3 presents the results. Next to each chart, p-v is the maximum p-value of the
individual signi…cance of the polynomial coe¢cients; and F is the F-statistic related to the
test of their joint signi…cance. The two charts at the top say that, except for the very less
developed countries, there exists a positive relationship between relative income levels and the
share of government support to research. For low levels of development, we observe a spike.
But this spike behavior appears nonrobust. In particular, the data is highly heteroskedastic
near zero. In addition, it could be the result of over…tting the data. We however …nd it
interesting because the model’s predictions can o¤er an explanation for this type of pattern.
The data on extension support do not provide a completely clear picture. The adjusted
line shows the same initial investment spike form as the research support case. When we look
at the whole 78-country sample, a hump shape behavior arises. Imitation subsidies increase
with the level of development, but only up to some point after which they decline. The 22-
OECD group chart, on the other hand, says that for the most advanced countries a constant
subsidization rate is what best …ts the data.
The pattern followed by extension policy is shown to be quite di¤erent from the one dis-
played by research policy. When we look at the sum of both forms of government support to
technical progress, the charts exhibit the same relationship with income levels as research sup-
port, which we discussed above. Finally, looking at the bottom of …gure 3, we can see a clear
tendency of the ratio of imitation to research support to decrease with the level of economic
development in both samples, as Rustichini and Schmitz (1991) found.
In sum, the empirical evidence presented in this section shows the following average pat-
18Den Haan and Marcet (1990) establish that these exponenciated polynomials can approximate any function
SR = f(y) by letting N go to in…nity. We also run OLS regressions using standard polynomials, but the ¹ R
2 was
always lower.
25terns. The very less developed countries do not display a clear behavior regarding technology
policy. For the rest of nations, we …rst …nd that the share of public research increases with
income levels, and so does the share of total public support. Second, public investment in
extension services seems to display a hump shape; although the OECD data say that di¤er-
ences across the most developed countries are not signi…cant. Third, the ratio of extension
to research support is inversely related to the level of economic development. If we take pub-
lic research and extension expenditures as good proxies for innovation and imitation policy,
respectively, the model’s predictions are fully consistent with the above empirical evidence.
266 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analyzed optimal government policy in an extension of Jones’s (1995) R&D-
based non-scale model of growth that includes imitation of foreign ideas. The main goal has
been to study the determinants of technology innovation and technology imitation policies. The
model that we have presented incorporates the possibility of copying through a technology that
exhibit diminishing imitation opportunities. As a country catches up with the more advanced
nations, both the imitation productivity and the negative externality generated by diminishing
imitation opportunities decline. The former e¤ect reduces the incentive to support imitation,
whereas the latter encourages innovation and imitation subsidies.
T h et r a n s i t i o nd y n a m i c so ft h es t u d i e df r a m e w o r kc a na c c o u n tf o rs o m ew e l l - k n o w ne m -
pirical regularities regarding the relationship between the level of economic development and
public technology policy, such us the declining pattern of the ratio of imitation to research sup-
port, and the increasing R&D subsidy share. Using cross-country data on government research
and extension expenditures from the agricultural sector, we have also documented that other
predictions of the model are consistent with the available empirical evidence. Interestingly, the
model also shows that anomalous behaviors, like large increases in R&D investment, and in
its support share, are possible at early stages of development due to a rapid decline of interest
rates. We interpret these …ndings as suggesting that foreign ideas can be the main driving
force behind technology imitation policy.
Comparing the social optimum and the competitive equilibrium paths, we …nd that public
intervention can produce important bene…ts, and that both technology and capital accumu-
lation policies have a very similar contribution to the welfare improvement. This …nding is
interesting because, in R&D-based non-scale models of growth al aJones (1995), policy does
not a¤ect long-run growth. We have shown, however, that level e¤ects can be signi…cant.
Thus preserving the important role attributed by more traditional R&D-based growth models
to policymakers.
Future research on the determinants of public imitation policy, and its interaction with
public innovation programs, should include the construction of better data sets, especially
outside the agricultural sector. Further work is also needed to assess the relative importance
of innovation, imitation, and capital accumulation subsidies along the economic development
path, and quantify their contribution to economic growth. Finally, it would be interesting
27to analyze how the introduction into our model of (a) additional market failure sources, like
creative destruction, (b) international trade of intermediate goods, or (c) modi…cations that
permit long-run policy e¤ects, like the ones proposed by Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998),
a¤ect technology policy.
28APPENDIX A
In order to study dynamics, we …rst need to state the system of equations that characterize
the equilibrium allocations. Regarding the command optimum, the Euler conditions for the
control variables, and motion equations for the state variables have already been worked out
in the main text. In the next section, we derive the ones for the decentralized economy with
taxes.
A.1 The competitive equilibrium
In our economy, there is a continuum of identical consumers of size (1 + n)tLo at date t.












where ct is the amount of consumption per capita in period t.
Inputs are not mobile, and must be exclusively supplied to domestic …rms. At each data
t, consumers supply their labor inelastically. In return for this service, they receive a wage
wt. We assume the existence of a capital market that supplies the savings of consumers to
intermediate-goods producers that issue securities. The equilibrium interest rate rt clears the
market at each point in time. The representative consumer’s feasibility constraint is then given
by
(1 + n) at+1 =( 1+rt+1)(at + wt ¡ ct ¡ ¿ht);( 2 6 )
where at is the value, in terms of output, of the securities owned by each consumer. Consumers
choose the time series of consumption that maximizes (25) subject to (26). The …rst order
condition to this problem gives the Euler equation for aggregate consumption:
Ct+1 =[ ½ (1 + rt+1)]
1
¾ (1 + n)
1¡ 1
¾ Ct : (27)
Final-goods manufacturers are price takers, and earn zero pro…ts in equilibrium. Because
intermediate goods are rented rather than sold, equation (1) implies that they solve the fol-
lowing problem:
max
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Equations (29) and (30) represent the inverse demand functions for labor and producer durables,
respectively. Given that all intermediate-goods designs provide the same improvement in pro-
ductivity, we hereafter focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which capital is evenly distributed
over all available types; that is, xit =¹ xt for all i.
Equation (13) says that it is optimal to subsidize the purchase of all intermediate goods at
t h es a m er a t e ,¹ ¿xt. Equations (30) and (12) then imply that, if xit =¹ xt for all i, the amount
of producer durables of a given type used in the economy is
¹ xt =
(1 ¡ ®)2 °






Knowing the gains from discovering new designs, intermediate-goods producers choose how
much capital to invest in R&D. Let Rt = RCt + RIt. From equations (17), (18) and (19), we
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The …rms’ optimal allocation to R&D across time will be determined by the evolution of the
design’s value Vt, which is pinned down by the following arbitrage condition:
1+rt+1 =
¹ pt+1 ¹ xt+1
Vt +¹ xt+1
+
Vt+1 +( 1¡ ±)¹ xt+1
Vt +¹ xt+1
: (33)
The RHS represents the return to engaging in intermediate-goods manufacturing. Buying a
patent right today and manufacturing the products that will be rented tomorrow provides a
return that equals the dividend (…rst summand) plus the capital gain/loss (second summand).
The LHS, in turn, gives the gross return from lending to other …rms. The above expression
says that, in equilibrium, …rms must be indi¤erent between the two alternatives.
From equations (12), (20), (31), (32) and (33), the R&D investment optimal motion in the
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30Comparing expression (34) to equation (16), we see that if
1¡¹ ¿R;t+1
1¡¹ ¿Rt =1 ,t h eo p t i m a lR & D
subsidy rate is given by





















At the aggregate level, market clearing is summarized by the economy’s feasibility con-
straint. We have seen (i) that households allocate …nal goods either to consumption or savings;
and (ii) that intermediate-goods manufacturers borrow capital to pay labor and the rental rate
on producer durables as R&D work is done, and to manufacture the new products. Finally,
since trade is not allowed in the model, domestic output must equal domestic expenditure.
The economy’s feasibility constraint is then given by
Yt = Ct + It + Rt;( 3 6 )
where It is investment at date t.T h el a wo fm o t i o no ft h ec a p i t a ls t o c ki s
Kt+1 =( 1¡ ±)Kt + It.( 3 7 )
In the decentralized economy with taxes, the perfect foresight equilibrium is the set of se-
quences of prices f!t;r t; ¹ ptg
1
t=0, allocations f¹ xt;I t;R Ct;R It;C tg
1
t=0,a n dp o l i c i e sf¿ht;¿Ct;¿It;¹ ¿xtg
1
t=0
such that Euler condition (27) characterizes the consumers’ behavior, …rms assign resources
according to equations (19), (31) and (34), the government balanced its budget given in ex-
pression (3), and market clearing condition (36) holds.
A.2 Normalization
In analyzing the equilibrium allocations, it is useful to rede…ne growing variables such that
the resulting normalized ones reach a steady-state. Given the economy’s feasibility constraint,
equation (36), we know that consumption, physical capital, and R&D investment will grow at
the same rate at steady-state. Production function (5) then implies that output growth will be
determined by the e¤ective-labor growth rate. Hence, the appropriate normalization factor for
these variables is A
»
®






are then measured in per capita-e¢ciency units. We de…ne






31We saw in section 4 that gAw = gA,a n dt h a tgY = gR. Equations (22) and (23) then say
that µ is a constant coe¢cient. In terms of normalized variables, an equilibrium is the set of
sequences of prices, normalized allocations
n
^ Kt; ^ It; ^ RCt; ^ RIt; ^ Ct
o1
t=0
, and policies satisfying the
optimality and equilibrium conditions.
Recall that ¿It = ¿Ct =¹ ¿Rt. The following di¤erence equation system formed by Eu-
ler equations (19), (27) and (34), the laws of motion (37) for Kt, and (8) and (15) for Tt,
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and
^ Rt = ^ RCt + ^ RIt.( 4 5 )
The same laws of motion and identities as in the decentralized case, expressions (42), (43),
(44) and (45), and Euler conditions (10), (14) and (16), appropriately normalized, de…ne the
social planning problem solutions. The second of these Euler equations is equivalent to (41);
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32Table 3: Solution algorithm accuracy for analyzed cases
%o fe r r o rf o rˆ Ct+1 % of error for ˆ Rt+1































































































































































A.3 Numerical approximation method
Following Judd (1992), we use high-degree polynomials in the state variables to replicate
the policy functions. The parameters of the approximated decision rules are chosen to (ap-
proximately) satisfy the Euler equations over a number of points in the state space, using
a nonlinear equation solver. A Chebyshev polynomial basis is used to construct the policy
functions, and the zeros of the basis form the points at which the system is solved; in other
words, we use the method of orthogonal collocation to choose these points. Finally, tensor
products of the states variables are employed in the polynomial representations. This method
has proven to be highly e¢cient in similar contexts. For example, for the one-sector growth
model, Judd (1992) …nds that the approximated values of the control variables disagree with
the values delivered by the true policy functions by no more than one part in 10,000.
For most models, however, we cannot directly assess how well the polynomial basis ap-
proximates the true solution; but there are indirect measures. For instance, as Judd (1992)
33argues, we can asses the Euler equation error over a large number of points using the ap-
proximated rules. For example, if we employ Euler equation (46), the measure will give the
current consumption decision error that agents using the approximated rules make, assuming
that the (true) optimal decisions were made in the previous period. The accuracy rises with
the degree of the polynomials. To run our simulations, we used polynomials of degree eight.
Higher degrees gave more accuracy, but results were almost identical. The policy functions
were approximated using the functional form
lnDt =ª 8(lnTt;K t) ;D t = Ct;R t ;
were ªn denotes the n-degree Chebyshev polynomial function. The steps followed were the
following. We …rst approximated the policy functions for the planning problem. Then, these
approximations were used to compute optimal state-dependent tax policy rules for the com-
petitive equilibrium solution. The programs were written in gauss-386, and are available upon
request. Table 3 reports the maximum and average Euler equation errors found over a grid
search of 10,000 state space points for the cases analyzed in the paper.
34APPENDIX B
The following table contains the data presented in Section 2. Numbers on GDP per worker
come from Penn World Tables, Version 5.6, available on line at
http://datacentre.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt/index.html.
For the other variables’ sources, see Judd, Boyce and Evenson (1986). We have data for the
years 1962, 1965, 1968, 1971, 1974, 1977 and 1980. For each variable, we compute the average
value.
Mean values of GDP per worker, and of research and extension expenditures as
percentage of the value of agricultural product: public sector
Extension Research Extension plus Extension over Relative GDP per
Country share share research share research (%) worker (U.S.=100)
Argentina 0.391 0.696 1.088 56.280 49.306
Australia 0.965 2.580 3.546 37.411 80.851
Austria 0.900 0.427 1.327 210.612 60.495
35Mean values of GDP per worker, and of research and extension expenditures as
percentage of the value of agricultural product: public sector, cont.
Extension Research Extension plus Extension over Relative GDP per
Country share share research share research (%) worker (U.S.=100)
Bangladesh 0.159 0.333 0.492 47.547 10.829
Belgium 0.075 0.813 0.888 9.174 74.201
Bolivia 0.141 0.586 0.727 24.096 17.114
Brazil 1.205 0.714 1.919 168.759 28.219
Burundi 0.637 0.333 0.970 191.173 2.651
Canada 0.922 2.282 3.205 40.406 84.378
Chile 0.651 0.970 1.621 67.091 31.416
Colombia 0.210 0.657 0.867 31.979 17.435
Costa Rica 0.421 0.333 0.754 126.249 5.804
Cyprus 0.543 0.728 1.271 74.477 35.927
Denmark 0.586 0.674 1.260 86.936 65.537
Ecuador 0.270 0.565 0.835 47.799 23.986
Egypt 1.580 0.547 2.127 288.671 14.458
El Salvador 0.189 0.298 0.488 63.477 19.190
England 0.865 1.206 2.071 71.761 62.345
Ethiopia 0.127 0.130 0.257 97.643 2.129
Finland 1.069 0.511 1.580 209.014 56.616
France 0.468 0.885 1.353 52.926 71.735
Ghana 0.803 0.587 1.390 136.843 8.084
Greece 0.165 0.419 0.584 39.387 36.836
Guatemala 0.276 0.348 0.624 79.484 23.780
Honduras 0.174 0.313 0.487 55.509 14.130
India 0.194 0.236 0.431 82.179 6.580
Indonesia 0.282 0.310 0.592 90.951 7.393
Iran 0.497 0.560 1.057 88.689 50.918
Ireland 0.645 1.260 1.905 51.216 45.515
Israel 0.627 1.786 2.413 35.084 55.301
Italy 0.302 0.544 0.846 55.519 65.020
Ivory Coast 2.054 1.126 3.181 182.414 11.265
Jamaica 0.142 0.457 0.599 31.182 20.336
Japan 0.843 2.607 3.450 32.320 37.655
Jordan 0.970 0.439 1.409 220.831 29.357
Kenya 1.626 0.890 2.517 182.693 5.770
Korea. Rep. 0.283 0.367 0.650 77.323 17.225
Liberia 0.222 0.126 0.349 175.850 7.737
Madagascar 1.058 0.734 1.792 144.268 7.354
Malawi 2.645 1.471 4.116 179.871 3.333
Malaysia 0.357 0.602 0.960 59.362 22.369
Mali 3.094 1.968 5.062 157.200 4.573
36Mean values of GDP per worker, and of research and extension expenditures as
percentage of the value of agricultural product: public sector, cont.
Extension Research Extension plus Extension over Relative GDP per
Country share share research share research (%) worker (U.S.=100)
Mexico 0.209 0.291 0.500 72.054 47.796
Morocco 1.468 0.419 1.887 350.133 17.321
Netherlands 0.786 3.041 3.827 25.854 82.937
New Zealand 0.429 1.531 1.961 28.034 80.756
Nicaragua 0.221 0.379 0.599 58.280 25.262
Nigeria 0.993 0.888 1.882 111.810 4.121
Norway 1.547 2.767 4.314 55.915 67.412
Pakistan 0.149 0.272 0.421 54.560 10.444
Panama 0.726 0.419 1.145 173.384 25.605
Paraguay 0.148 0.463 0.611 32.081 16.622
Peru 0.610 0.689 1.299 88.578 30.181
Philippines 0.332 0.176 0.508 188.548 13.574
Portugal 1.008 1.485 2.493 67.889 29.610
Rwanda 0.384 0.165 0.549 233.395 3.659
South Africa 0.766 1.261 2.027 60.790 29.455
Senegal 2.071 1.479 3.550 139.973 7.963
Sierra Leone 0.255 0.203 0.458 125.248 9.166
Spain 0.239 0.539 0.778 44.362 56.454
Sri Lanka 0.979 0.689 1.668 142.119 12.354
Sudan 1.885 0.592 2.477 318.231 8.245
Sweden 0.566 1.012 1.578 55.992 75.308
Switzerland 0.343 1.786 2.129 19.214 88.354
Syria 3.161 0.397 3.558 795.774 37.941
Taiwan 0.147 0.314 0.461 46.956 22.290
Tanzania 0.804 0.485 1.290 165.687 2.755
Thailand 0.403 0.474 0.877 85.071 10.223
Trin. and Toba. 1.458 0.666 2.124 219.086 75.782
Tunisia 2.334 0.701 3.034 333.157 20.239
Turkey 0.244 0.178 0.421 137.158 17.527
Uganda 1.303 0.766 2.069 170.038 4.219
Uruguay 0.223 0.380 0.603 58.592 35.007
U.S. 0.485 1.039 1.524 46.707 100
Venezuela 1.013 1.260 2.273 80.392 81.698
W. Germany 0.327 1.208 1.534 27.055 71.567
Zaire 0.841 0.466 1.308 180.434 4.501
Zimbabwe 0.423 0.776 1.200 54.488 8.811
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